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Abstract.    The  allocation  of  water  in  a  multi-country  river  system  necessarily  involves 
conflicting objectives, where increasing water benefits to one country may entail losses to 
other  countries.   This paper presents the formulation and application of  a multi-objective 
linear programming model, where each objective represents the benefits to a country from 
using water for agriculture, urban consumption, and energy production, net of conveyance 
costs.  This model is applied to the Euphrates and Tigris river basin, with the three objective 
functions representing the net water benefits to the three riparian countries – Turkey, Syria, 
and Iraq.  The model is used to delineate the set of non-inferior solutions (Pareto frontiers), 
where no individual country benefits can be increased without reducing the benefits of at least 
another country.  These Pareto frontiers, and the underlying water resources allocations, are 
graphically displayed and analyzed under different scenarios related to river flow, electricity 
price, and agricultural productivity.  The trade-offs between the three benefits are assessed, 
providing the basis for possible compromises among the three countries. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
There has been an ongoing competition over the control of water resources in the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris  basin.  Increasing  population  pressures  and  long-term  development 
expectations have triggered tensions and conflicts among the riparian countries. In particular, 
Turkey  has  started  implementing  an  ambitious  project,  the  Southeastern  Anatolia 
Development  Project  (GAP),  to  eliminate  regional  socio-economic  disparities  by  utilizing 
water resources in the basin, especially for agriculture and electricity production. Due to their 
upstream geographical positions, the GAP investments by Turkey have been regarded by both 
Syria and Iraq as threats to their welfare and aspirations.  
To  analyze  these  conflicts,  Kucukmehmetoglu  and  Guldmann  (K-G)  (2004)  have 
developed the Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ETRBM). This model assumes that 
the basin will be completely developed in the year 2040, and provides optimal allocations of 
water among the riparian countries under various scenarios. The ETRBM optimizes the use of 
basin resources without accounting for country power.  In reality, each country has a separate 
objective  function,  and  some  countries  may  have  more  weight  than  others,  due  to  their 
political, economic, or geographical characteristics.  An alternative approach is to find water 
allocations where no one country can be made better off without making some other country 
worse off, i.e., the Pareto Frontier Surface (PFS).  All the points on the PFS represent the set 
of non-inferior solutions/allocations. 
This paper presents a multi-objective programming model generating Pareto frontiers 
representing  the  tradeoffs  among  country  net  economic  benefits,  under  various  scenarios 
related to 1) annual tributary flow, 2) energy price, and 3) country agricultural productivity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 consists of a literature review.  
The modeling methodology is presented in Section 3.  Applications are described in Section 4.  
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A first  stream of literature involves models  based on  the  spatial price  equilibrium 
framework developed by Samuelson (1952), and on its quadratic programming version  later 
developed by Takayama and Judge (1964). Flinn & Guise (1970) applied this approach to a 
hypothetical water resources allocation problem. Vaux and Howitt (1984) applied the model 
to a real-world problem for California water resources in a market context. Booker & Young 
(1994) considered a similar model for the Colorado River basin within riparian (Arizona,   2 
Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada) and non-riparian (California) states of the US and 
Mexico.  Dinar  &  Wolf  (1994),  focusing  on  the  Nile,  tested  the  potential  advantage  of 
international water trade among Israel, Egypt, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Finally, 
Mahan, Horbulyk, and Rowse (2002) developed a model for Southern Alberta to best utilize 
regional water resources.  
A  second  stream  of  literature  focuses  on  the  allocation  of  scarce  water  resources 
among cooperating or conflicting parties, using game theory methods. Rogers (1969) showed 
the  potential  economic  benefits  of  common  development  strategies  in  the  Ganges  basin 
through a coalition between East-Pakistan and India. When East-Pakistan broke away from 
Pakistan as an independent state (Bangladesh), Rogers (1993) reformulated the issue in a 
three-country allocation framework (Nepal, Bangladesh, and India).  Dinar & Wolf (1994) 
listed the most meaningful coalition scenarios among the four parties, and then evaluated the 
economic benefits obtained under these scenarios.  Dufournaud & Harrington (1990) brought 
a  temporal  dimension  into  the  game  theory  framework,  considering  both  the  spatial  and 
temporal pattern of costs and benefits from river development. K-G (2004), after building the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris  River  Basin  Model  (ETRBM),  an  optimization  model,  applied 
cooperative game theory concepts to search for possible coalitions in the Euphrates and Tigris 
basin.  
 
3. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
In order to present the theoretical framework of this research, it is assumed that a river 
basin encompasses two countries, Country I downstream and Country II upstream. These two 
countries gain economic benefits, NEBI and NEBII, from the use of basin water resources for 
energy, urban, and agricultural purposes.  
Consider first the nature of water resources utilization. There are three cases regarding 
the availability of slack water resources. The first one is the starting case, wherein there is a 
significant amount of slack (unused) resources and no shortage of water. In Figure 1, point O 
represents such a case.  Potential water resources can be tapped to contribute to the economy 
of both countries. The second case is the improvement case, where the countries use the 
potential resources for their own net economic benefits. In Figure 1, the area OAXB is the set 
of cases where improvements for both countries may take place. The third case is the frontier 
case, where countries use all available resources (no slack). On this frontier, any increase in   3 
one country’s net economic benefits results in a decrease in the other country’s net economic 
benefits. In Figure 1, the frontier represented by the arc AXB is the set of solutions where no 
one country can be made better off without making the other worse off, and  is called the 
Pareto Frontier (PF).  
In Figure 1, points A and B correspond to the maximum gains achieved by country I 
and II, respectively, while the other country retains its initial benefits.  The obtained PF is not 
limited to the arc between point A and B, and could extend to points C and D, or even beyond 
points C and D. Currently,  the riparian countries of the Euphrates and Tigris basin, are still in 
the improvement phase.  It is assumed that a Pareto Optimal (PO) solution will be reached by 
the year 2040.  
The  non-inferior  solution  set  (PF)  can  be  obtained  via  two  different  methods:  1) 
Weighting method, in which each country net economic benefit is assigned a weight, and the 
aggregate weighted benefits are maximized.  Using a large number of weights combinations 
will generate many frontier points (curve PF). 2) Constraint method, in which one country net 
economic benefit is maximized subject to constraining the minimum net economic benefits of 
the other country.  The frontier may vary, depending upon the exogenous parameters.  The 
PF2 and PF3 curves in Figure 2 represent changes in system parameters, as compared to PF1.   
 



























3.2. BASIC OPTIMIZATION MODEL: THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVER  
       BASIN MODEL (ETRBM)
  
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers follow two separate basins before their confluence 
near Basra to form the Shatt al-Arab, which flows into the Persian Gulf. The ETRBM closely 
reflects, in network form, the E-T basin physical structure, incorporating supply reservoirs    4 
and centers of water demand throughout the basin.  It includes 63 demand (i) and 45 supply (j) 
nodes. The supply nodes (either dam or confluence of tributaries) provide water for both 
urban and agricultural uses, and each demand node is assumed to be served by only one 
supply node, the most accessible one.  There are three inter-basin links, all from the Tigris to 
the Euphrates, with one already built (the Tharthar Canal).  Of the 63 demand nodes, 37 are  
agricultural nodes, and 26 urban nodes.  More details on this network are available in K-G 
(2004).   
The  ETRBM  is  a  linear  programming  model  designed  to  maximize  the  total  net 
benefits of the three riparian countries – Turkey, Syria, and Iraq – subject to resources, water 
balance,  and  usage  constraints.    The  net  benefits  are  the  gross  benefits  derived  from 
agricultural, urban, and energy uses of the water in the basin at the various demand nodes, 
minus the water transportation costs from supply to demand nodes and over inter-basin links.  
The model accounts for the fundamental trade-off between off-stream water withdrawal for 
agricultural and urban uses, and on-stream electricity production.  The basic model is made of 
Equations (1) – (4):  
 
Maximize  
NEB = ∑iÎag Vag ×∑jWji - ∑j, iÎag Cag × Dji × Wji  + ∑ iÎur Vur ×∑jWji  
               -∑j, iÎur Cur × Dji × Wji    + ∑j,l Pe × Ej × Qjl      
               -[(Q28,14 ×Css ×D28,14) + (Q31,16 ×Css ×D31,16) + (Q21,12 ×Css ×D21,12)]  (1) 
 
Subject to 
        ∑i Wji + ∑l Qjl + ELj = ∑i RFij × (∑j Wji) + Tj + ∑l Qlj   "  j       (2) 
        Minag × Si  ≤  ∑j Wji  ≤  Maxag × Si        "  i Î ag  (3) 
        Minur × Si  ≤  ∑j Wji  ≤  Maxur × Si        "  i Î ur       (4) 
 
  The indices,  variables and parameters are defined in the Appendix.  The total net 
economic benefit, NEB, is the sum of (1) the net benefits of water usage to agriculture,   
∑ iÎagr Vag.(∑jWji) - ∑j, iÎagr Cag.Dji.Wji , (2)   the net benefits of water usage to urban centers  
∑ iÎurb Vur.(∑jWji) - ∑j, iÎurb Cur.Dji.Wji , and (3) the total energy benefits ∑j,l Pe.Ej.Qjl , net of 
total inter-basin link costs  (Q28,14.Css.D28,14) + (Q31,16.Css.D31,16 ) + (Q21,12.Css.D21,12). 
    Equation (2) represents the water balance constraint at node j.  The water inputs 
to supply node j are the tributary inflows Tj, the return flows from the upstream withdrawals, 
taken as the sum of the products of return flow rates and withdrawals at node i, ∑iRFij×(∑jWji), 
and water from upstream nodes  l to  j, ∑lQlj. On the  other  hand,  water leaving  node j  is   5 
allocated to reservoir evaporation ELj, water withdrawal for agricultural and urban uses ∑iWji, 
and water release to downstream nodes   ∑lQjl .   
  The  parameter  Si  is  a  measure  of  the  size  of  demand  node  i  (either  urban  or 
agriculture),  and  Minag,  Minur,  Maxag,  Maxur  represent  minimum  usage  rates  –  to  sustain 
agricultural  and  urban  activities  –  and  maximum  usage  rates  –  to  prevent  excessive 
withdrawals, leading constraints (3) and (4). 
  The data used to calibrate the ETRBM are detailed in K-G (2004). 
 
3.3. PARETO FRONTIER BY THE WEIGHTING METHOD 
The ETRBM assumes that every country has equal weight in the process of estimating 
total net benefits. That solution is of course on the PF.  Defining the net economic benefits as 
NEBt for Turkey, NEBs for Syria, and NEBi for Iraq, we obtain:  
 




NEBt =  ∑iÎtaVta ×∑jWji - ∑j, iÎta Cta × Dji × Wji   
+ ∑ iÎtuVtu ×∑jWji  -∑j, iÎtu Ctu × Dji × Wji    
+ ∑jÎst,l Pe × Ej × Qjl                  (12) 
 
NEBs =  ∑iÎsaVsa ×∑jWji - ∑j, iÎsa Csa × Dji × Wji   
+ ∑ iÎsuVsu ×∑jWji  -∑j, iÎsu Csu × Dji × Wji     
+ ∑jÎss,l Pe × Ej × Qjl  - (Q21,12 ×Css ×D21,12)        (13) 
 
NEBi =  ∑iÎiaVia ×∑jWji - ∑j, iÎia Cia × Dji × Wji   
+ ∑ iÎiuViu ×∑jWji  -∑j, iÎiu Ciu × Dji × Wji     
            + ∑jÎsi,l Pe × Ej × Qjl   -(Q28,14 ×Css ×D28,14) - (Q31,16 ×Css ×D31,16)   (14) 
 
 st(j) are the supply nodes in Turkey, ss(j) the supply nodes in Syria, si(j) the supply nodes in 
Iraq, ta(i)  the agricultural demand nodes in Turkey, tu(i)  the urban demand nodes in Turkey, 
sa(i)  the agricultural demand nodes in Syria, su(i) the urban demand nodes in Syria, ia(i)  the 
agricultural demand nodes in Iraq, and iu(i)  the urban demand nodes in Iraq. 
A set of Pareto-admissible (non-inferior) solutions can be obtained by maximizing a 
weighted (Wk³0, at least one Wk>0) sum of the benefits, as illustrated in Equation (15): 
 
Maximize  G = Wt NEBt + Ws NEBs +Wi NEBi        (15) 
   6 
The  ETRBM  can  be  easily  adapted  to  the  weighting  method,  as  the  basic  model 
constraints remain the same, and the only reformulation is for its objective function.  Selecting 
a large number of weight combinations, and solving the new model for each of them, will 
generate a large number of Pareto-admissible solutions, points on the Pareto Frontier Surface 
(PFS).  However, these solutions are not necessarily homogenously distributed throughout the 
frontier surface, and there is no way of controlling this distribution.   
   
3.4. PARETO FRONTIER BY THE CONSTRAINT METHOD 
A Pareto-admissible solution can also be generated by maximizing the benefit of one 
country, while setting lower bounds for the other two countries’ benefits. Assume that the net 
economic benefits of Iraq (NEBi) are maximized, and let CNEBt
* and CNEBs
* be the lower 
bounds on Turkey’s and Syria’s benefits, respectively. The model to be solved is then: 
  
Maximize   NEBi                (16) 
 
Subject to  NEBt ≥ CNEBt
*              (17) 
 
NEBs ≥ CNEBs
*              (18) 
 
As with the weighting method, the ETRBM can be easily adapted to the constraint 
method by reducing its objective function to the net economic benefits of Iraq (NEBi) and by 
adding constraints (17) and (18). The reason for selecting NEBi as the objective function is 
that, based on the geography  of the basin, Iraq  is at the receiving end  of the impacts of 
upstream country decisions.  Note that a solution is Pareto-admissible only if both constraints 
are binding. At points where the constraints are binding, the dual values of constraints (17) 
and (18) measure the impacts of Turkish and Syrian changes in their minimum net economic 
benefits (CNEBt, CNEBs) on Iraqi net economic benefits (NEBi), and are necessarily negative. 
In the following, these dual values are noted MNEBit and MNEBis.   
Figure 3 illustates the procedure for obtaining constraint values (CNEBt
* and CNEBs
*) 
for Equations (17) and (18). Based on the range of benefits derived by using the weighting 
method, the maximum Turkish benefit NEBt
max is divided into increments of $20 million, and 
CNEBt
* is set as equal to each of these values. The Syrian range is subdivided in the same 
way,  and  CNEBs
*  is  progressively  increased  while  solving  model  (16)  –  (18).  When 
constraints (17) and (18) become binding, the Pareto frontier starts being generated.  
   











4. MODEL APPLICATION 
 
4.1. SCENARIOS 
Both  the  weighting  and  constraint  methods  are  implemented  under  18  different 
scenarios that combine three different annual flow regimes (I:T=59.8, II:T=81.9, III:T=92.6 
Bm
3),  two  energy  prices  (1:Pe=$0/MWh,  2:Pe=$25/MWh),  and  three  different  patterns  of 
agricultural productivity in the three riparian countries (A:T=1.2,S=1,I=0.8; B:T=1,S=1,I=1; 
C:T=0.8,S=1,I=1.2). These scenarios are coded as presented in Table 1.  For instance, BII2 
refers to agricultural productivity B (T=S=I=1), flow II (T=81.9 Bm
3), and energy 2 (Pe=$25/ 
MWh). These scenarios are based on earlier research reported in K-G (2004). 
In order to delineate benefit ranges on the Pareto frontier surfaces (PFS), country net 
benefits are weighted by a large number of weight combinations. A 3-dimensional grid of 
weights is created, where weights are altered by small increments and always sum up to 3. 
Initially, in order to obtain a clear view of the PFS, a large number of weight scenarios were 
used; however, the obtained PFS points were not homogeneously distributed over the PFS. 
Therefore, the model was solved over 4 different weight combinations: the first one assumes 
that all countries have equal weights (1 for all countries); the three other combinations involve 
assigning a weight of 3 to one country, and weights of 0 to the other two countries.  Thus, the 
upper bounds of country net benefits and ranges can be estimated, that will provide the basis 
for  specifying  the  incremental  values  (by  $20  million  step)  to  be  used  in  the  constraint 
method.  
Figure 3: Generation of Grids and 
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Table 1: Scenarios 
1: Pe =$0 2: Pe =$25 1: Pe =$0 2: Pe =$25 1: Pe =$0 2: Pe =$25
Turkey 1.2
Syria    1.0
Iraq      0.8
Turkey 1.0
Syria    1.0
Iraq      1.0
Turkey 0.8
Syria    1.0






















4.2. RESULTS  
4.2.1.  WEIGHTING METHOD 
  There are several purposes for using this method: (1) to determine the maximum 
attainable system-wide benefits (NEBt+NEBs+NEBi), when assigning the same weight to each 
country; (2) to obtain the maximum attainable country benefit by using the available 
resources, completely favoring one country at the expense of the two others; (3) to measure 
the difference between these two benefits for each country; and (4) to obtain benefits ranges to 
establish PFS grids 
The top left quadrants of Tables 2 and 3 present country net economic benefits with 
equal and extreme weights, respectively. Table 2 also provides the sum of country benefits. 
The top right quadrants represent, first, percent changes in benefits resulting from inclusion of 
energy into the model (the first three columns), and,  second, the percent changes in benefits 
resulting from changes in the annual total tributary flows from benchmark II (the last four 
columns). The bottom left quadrants present the percent changes in net economic benefits due 
to  changes  in  agricultural  productivity,  as  compared  to  benchmark  B.  The  absolute  and 
percent differences between the top left quadrants of Tables 2 and 3 are summarized in Table 
4. 
 
The Case of Equal Country Weights  
The first three columns of the top right quadrant of Table 2 show that, although every 
country  is  affected  differently,  all  countries  derive  positive  net  economic  benefits  from 
including energy in the optimization (Pe=$0/MWh→$25/MWh). The largest economic gain 
goes  to  Turkey,  due  to  its  high  terrain  and  upstream  position  in  the  basin.  However, 
downstream countries also benefit from water use for hydroelectric power production.    9 
The last four columns of the top right quadrant of Table 2 show that increasing annual 
tributary  flows  (59.8→81.9→92.6Bm
3)  also  has  positive  effects  on  all  counties.  When 
electricity generation is ignored (Pe=$0/MWh), the downstream country of Iraq is the major 
beneficiary. On the other hand, when considering energy benefits (Pe=$25/MWh), Turkey 
gains significantly because the additional water resources are used for both energy generation 
and other consumptive uses.  
Because  the  net  benefit  of  Iraq  is  mainly  derived  from  agriculture,  changes  in 
agricultural productivity patterns affect mainly Iraq, which has a downstream location, and a 
significant amount of agricultural land in the basin; therefore, the productivity impact in Iraq 
is especially prominent when energy is considered (Pe=$25/MWh). When energy is ignored 
(Pe=$0/MWh), the shift from the higher Turkish agricultural productivity to the higher Iraqi 
productivity in a seesaw fashion is clearly reflected in the changes in net economic benefits.   
 
Table 2: Net Economic Benefits Using Equal Weights ($10
6) 
Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25
NEBt 412.4 886.2 413.7 1168.2 414.3 1297.9
NEBs 167.3 258.7 178.8 302.8 182.1 327.2
NEBi 829.7 951.3 997.7 1129.3 1053.3 1200.1
SUM 1409.4 2096.3 1590.1 2600.3 1649.7 2825.2
NEBt 277.7 810.0 328.1 1088.8 328.5 1217.9
NEBs 159.6 249.6 166.1 302.0 175.1 326.4
NEBi 1101.7 1259.5 1348.7 1527.6 1447.0 1632.5
SUM 1539.0 2319.0 1842.9 2918.3 1950.5 3176.7
NEBt 165.5 788.9 226.6 1067.6 239.4 1199.4
NEBs 153.0 251.7 171.8 302.0 175.1 326.4
NEBi 1449.2 1544.2 1751.0 1906.0 1858.6 2040.4














(2-1) % (2-1) % (2-1) % (I-II) % (III-II) % (I-II) % (III-II) %
NEBt 114.9 182.4 213.3 -0.3 0.1 -24.1 11.1
NEBs 54.7 69.4 79.7 -6.4 1.9 -14.6 8.1
NEBi 14.7 13.2 13.9 -16.8 5.6 -15.8 6.3
SUM 48.7 63.5 71.3 -11.4 3.7 -19.4 8.7
NEBt 191.7 231.8 270.8 -15.4 0.1 -25.6 11.9
NEBs 56.4 81.9 86.4 -3.9 5.4 -17.4 8.1
NEBi 14.3 13.3 12.8 -18.3 7.3 -17.6 6.9
SUM 50.7 58.4 62.9 -16.5 5.8 -20.5 8.9
NEBt 376.7 371.2 401.1 -27.0 5.6 -26.1 12.3
NEBs 64.5 75.8 86.4 -10.9 1.9 -16.7 8.1
NEBi 6.6 8.9 9.8 -17.2 6.1 -19.0 7.1





Pe =$0 Pe =$25
 
Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25
∆NEBt 48.5 9.4 26.1 7.3 26.1 6.6
∆NEBs 4.8 3.7 7.6 0.3 4.0 0.3
∆NEBi -24.7 -24.5 -26.0 -26.1 -27.2 -26.5
∆SUM -8.4 -9.6 -13.7 -10.9 -15.4 -11.1
∆NEBt -40.4 -2.6 -31.0 -1.9 -27.1 -1.5
∆NEBs -4.1 0.9 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆NEBi 31.5 22.6 29.8 24.8 28.4 25.0











The Case of Extreme Country Weights  
The results derived with the extreme weighting scheme provide upper limits on the 
Pareto Frontier Surfaces (PFS), to be used as suggested in the two-country grid illustrated in 
Figure 3. Table 3 presents the maximum attainable country net benefits. These benefits are 
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Table 3: Maximum Attainable Net Economic Benefits Using Single Country Extreme Weights ($10
6) 
Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25
NEBt 412.4        904.9        413.7        1,173.5     414.3        1,303.2    
NEBs 207.6        265.0        214.1        315.5        217.3        339.9       
NEBi 946.2        1,029.1     1,042.8     1,182.6     1,082.9     1,247.6    
NEBt 329.3        850.1        330.1        1,118.2     330.4        1,247.7    
NEBs 200.5        265.0        207.1        315.5        210.3        339.9       
NEBi 1,232.1     1,314.7     1,410.2     1,545.8     1,484.0     1,648.8    
NEBt 253.1        817.3        253.4        1,085.0     253.5        1,214.2    
NEBs 191.8        265.0        198.4        315.5        201.5        339.9       
NEBi 1,519.4     1,601.3     1,777.5     1,915.6     1,885.1     2,050.2    
C









(2-1) % (2-1) % (2-1) % (I-II) % (III-II) % (I-II) % (III-II) %
NEBt 119.4 183.7 214.6 -0.3 0.1 -22.9 11.1
NEBs 27.6 47.3 56.4 -3.0 1.5 -16.0 7.7
NEBi 8.8 13.4 15.2 -9.3 3.8 -13.0 5.5
NEBt 158.2 238.8 277.6 -0.2 0.1 -24.0 11.6
NEBs 32.2 52.3 61.6 -3.2 1.5 -16.0 7.7
NEBi 6.7 9.6 11.1 -12.6 5.2 -15.0 6.7
NEBt 222.9 328.2 379.0 -0.1 0.1 -24.7 11.9
NEBs 38.1 59.0 68.6 -3.3 1.6 -16.0 7.7
NEBi 5.4 7.8 8.8 -14.5 6.1 -16.4 7.0






Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25 Pe =$0 Pe =$25
∆NEBt 25.2 6.4 25.3 4.9 25.4 4.5
∆NEBs 3.5 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.3 0.0
∆NEBi -23.2 -21.7 -26.0 -23.5 -27.0 -24.3
∆NEBt -23.1 -3.9 -23.2 -3.0 -23.3 -2.7
∆NEBs -4.3 0.0 -4.2 0.0 -4.2 0.0












Table 3 provides a picture similar to that of Table 2.  Although every country receives 
positive net economic benefits, a positive energy value (Pe =$25MWh) contributes the most to 
Turkey, due to its high country terrains and its high rainfalls (first three columns in the top 
right quadrant of Table 3). More water leads to larger net benefits for all countries; however, 
when energy generation is considered (Pe =$25/MWh), the percent change in NEB is more 
prominent in Turkey than in the other countries; on the other hand, when energy generation is 
ignored (Pe =$0/MWh), Iraq is the country prominently benefiting from water availability. 
However,  when  the  energy  price  is  positive  (Pe  =$25/MWh),  increased  agricultural 
productivity loses its importance for Turkey, because in Turkey there is a significant tradeoff 
between energy generation and consumptive uses of water. 
 
Differences Between Equal and Extreme Weight Country Benefits    
  While the equally-weighted optimization results provide the maximum net economic 
benefits for the entire basin, the optimization results using extreme weights provide maximum 
country net economic benefits. Table 4 presents both the absolute and percentage differences 
between the left top quadrants of Tables 2 and 3.  
In absolute value terms, the most extensive difference is for Iraq under scenarios AI1 
and  BI1,  up  to  $130Million.  The  smallest  absolute  change  is  for  Turkey,  when  energy 
generation is ignored (Pe=$0/MWh) and agricultural productivity favors Turkey (A).  
In percentage terms, the largest deviations in benefits are observed under scenarios  
(AI1,BI1,CI1), that exclude energy (Pe=$0/MWh) and assume minimum annual total tributary 
flows (59.8 Bm
3). When energy is included in the model, while utilizing its energy generation 
potential, Turkey releases significant amounts of water to downstream countries, which seems   11 
to significantly satisfy downstream country consumptive demands; therefore, when energy is 
considered, extreme country weights do not lead to significant deviations from the benefits 
obtained under equal weights (AI2, BI2, CI2, AII2, BII2, CII2, AIII2, BIII2, CIII2). The 
higher  the  energy  value,  the  more  water  is  supplied  to  downstream  countries.  Therefore, 
energy generation potentially alleviates allocation issues among the riparian countries.   
Naturally,  any  increase  in  the  annual  water  supply  (I→II→III)  results  in  lower 
percentage deviations. In all the scenarios where energy generation is ignored, Syria is the 
country that derives a significant increase in economic benefits. On the other hand, including  
energy reduces the percent deviations between the corresponding values in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 4: Difference Between Equally and Extremely Weighted Country Benefits ($10
6) 
  %   %   %   %   %   %
NEBt 0.0 0.0 18.7 2.1 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.4
NEBs 40.4 24.1 6.3 2.4 35.4 19.8 12.7 4.2 35.2 19.3 12.7 3.9
NEBi 116.4 14.0 77.8 8.2 45.2 4.5 53.3 4.7 29.5 2.8 47.4 4.0
NEBt 51.6 15.7 40.1 4.7 1.9 0.6 29.5 2.6 1.9 0.6 29.8 2.4
NEBs 40.9 20.4 15.5 5.8 41.0 19.8 13.5 4.3 35.2 16.7 13.5 4.0
NEBi 130.3 10.6 55.3 4.2 61.5 4.4 18.3 1.2 37.0 2.5 16.4 1.0
NEBt 87.6 34.6 28.5 3.5 26.8 10.6 17.4 1.6 14.2 5.6 14.8 1.2
NEBs 38.8 20.2 13.3 5.0 26.6 13.4 13.5 4.3 26.4 13.1 13.5 4.0













4.2.3.  CONSTRAINT METHOD 
There are two main purposes for using this method: (1) to visualize the PFS over 
which countries trade-off their benefits; (2) to measure the ranges of country benefits; and (3) 
to measure the marginal benefits over the PFS. 
Following the methodology described in Section 3.4, the net economic benefits of 
Iraq, NEBi, are maximized subject to satisfying minimum net benefits for Turkey, CNEBt
*, 
and Syria, CNEBs
*.  After eliminating infeasible solutions or optimal solutions that are not 
located on the PFS (constraints 17 and/or 18 not binding), the remaining points are used to 
plot three-dimensional PFS surfaces. The total number of valid solutions on a PFS measures 
the extent of the trade-offs between Turkey and Syria while maximizing the net economic 
benefits of Iraq.  The numbers of valid solution points are presented in Table 5 for all 18 
scenarios.  
The 18 scenarios PFSs are plotted on Figure 4, illustrating not only the variations in 
the sizes of the PFSs but also the shifts resulting from changing parametric assumptions. The 
top left quadrant presents a three-dimensional plotting of the 18 different PFSs. The right top 
quadrant presents an aerial view of the Turkish and Syrian net economic benefits points on the   12 
PFSs.  The bottom right quadrant presents vertical cuts of the PFSs, showing changes in Iraqi 
net economic benefits as functions of changes in Turkish economic benefits.  Finally, the 
bottom left quadrant presents similar cuts showing the relationships between Syrian and Iraqi 
net economic benefits.      
Table 5 shows that scenario AI1 has the most extensive PFS. This scenario assumes 
that  Turkish  agricultural  land  is  more  productive  than  that  of  the  downstream  countries,  
energy  generation  is  ignored,  and  the  annual  flow  is  at  its  minimum.  This  combination 
generates the most extensive tradeoff among the three riparian countries.  The size of the PFS 
declines with the inclusion of  energy  production, increasing annual flows,  and increasing 
agricultural  productivity  in  Iraq.  However,  the  last  column  (maximum  annual  flow  and 
Pe=$25/MWh)  points  to  an  increase  in  the  PFS,  suggesting  that,  after  satisfaction  of 
consumptive uses, energy generation is the basis of country benefit tradeoffs.  
 








Table 5: Numbers of Valid Solutions on the PFS 
EPR=$0 EPR=$25 EPR=$0 EPR=$25 EPR=$0 EPR=$25
A 195 122 66 61 25 66
B 175 96 30 46 19 52
C 119 87 24 47 12 45
Minimum Flow Average Flow Maximum Flow
   13 
Figure 5 presents, in the case of scenario AI1, three-dimensional, aerial, and vertical 
views of the PFS, as well as the marginals of constraints (17) and (18). Scenario AI1 has the 
most extensive PFS among the 18 scenarios.  
   
Figure 5: PFS and Marginal Values for Scenario AI1 
   
   




The PFS may be represented, mathematically, by the relationship 
 
    NEBi = F(CNEBt
*, CNEBs
* ) .          (19) 
 
The marginal values are the derivatives: 
 
    MNEBit = 
*
t CNEB / F ¶ ¶  
                        (20) 
 
    MNEBis = 
*
s CNEB / F ¶ ¶
                        (21)   14 
 
The bottom quadrants of Figure 5 present the values of MNEBit and MNEBis at each valid 
point on the PFS.  The marginal benefits are, of course, obtained as the dual solutions for 
constraints (17) and (18).  Graphically, the marginal benefits measure the slopes of the PFS. 
 
Table 6 presents country minimum and maximum net benefits, and the corresponding 
ranges, as obtained by application of the constraint method. The ranges are decreasing with  
increasing  water  availability  in  the  basin  (I→II→III).  This  decline  is  most  prominent  for 
NEBi, and implies that the more water is available, the lesser the tradeoffs between Iraq and 
the other countries. When energy is included, the ranges increase because energy generates 
economic value, but not necessarily in competition with consumptive uses in downstream 
countries. The larger ranges for Turkey imply that the upstream country faces more extensive 
tradeoffs with the other countries.   
 
Table 6: Net Benefits ($10
6) 
Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max
NEBt 412        -      412      660        243      903      400        -       400      660        511      1,171   400        -       400      706        597      1,303   
NEBs 180        20        200      185        80        265      80          120      200      115        200      315      20          180      200      100        240      340      
NEBi 244        702      946      109        920      1,029   70          973      1,043   54          1,127   1,182   39          1,044   1,083   47          1,199   1,247   
NEBt 329        -      329      660        177      837      320        -       320      680        426      1,106   320        -       320      707        541      1,248   
NEBs 200        -      200      165        100      265      40          161      201      95          220      315      20          180      200      100        240      340      
NEBi 397        835      1,232   186        1,129   1,315   116        1,294   1,410   72          1,473   1,545   73          1,410   1,484   59          1,589   1,648   
NEBt 253        -      253      701        117      817      240        -       240      718        367      1,085   240        -       240      701        513      1,214   
NEBs 160        20        180      170        95        265      60          121      181      94          222      315      20          178      198      100        240      340      
NEBi 303        1,216   1,519   244        1,357   1,601   124        1,652   1,776   80          1,835   1,915   66          1,819   1,885   56          1,993   2,049   
EPR=$0 EPR=$25
Minimum Flow Average Flow Maximum Flow








Every point on the PFS is associated to marginal Iraqi net economic benefits resulting 
from changes in both Turkish and Syrian net economic benefits. Table 7 presents the extreme 
values of the marginal benefits of Iraq with respect to the minimum benefits of Turkey and 
Syria. On the PFS, all marginal values are negative.  They measure the decrease in Iraq’s net 
benefits resulting from a $1 increase in CNEBt
* and CNEBs
*. The greater the absolute value of 
 
Table 7: Ranges of Marginal Values ($) 
Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max
MNEBit 2.67 -2.68 -0.01 4.83 -4.84 -0.01 0.46 -0.47 -0.01 1.65 -1.66 -0.01 0.87 -0.88 -0.01 1.65 -1.66 -0.01
MNEBis 37.66 -37.67 -0.01 400.48 -400.49 -0.01 6.54 -6.55 -0.01 372.20 -372.21 -0.01 10.42 -10.51 -0.09 651.28 -651.32 -0.04
MNEBit 8.30 -8.31 -0.01 1.82 -1.84 -0.02 1.40 -1.41 -0.01 1.17 -1.19 -0.02 1.47 -1.48 -0.01 6.83 -6.84 -0.01
MNEBis 68.31 -68.33 -0.02 1113.65 -1113.67 -0.02 19.40 -19.41 -0.01 922.27 -922.28 -0.01 19.18 -19.36 -0.18 859.96 -859.97 -0.01
MNEBit 8.90 -8.91 -0.01 5.63 -5.66 -0.03 4.05 -4.07 -0.02 4.58 -4.61 -0.03 1.52 -1.54 -0.02 4.60 -4.61 -0.01




Minimum Flow Average Flow Maximum Flow
EPR=$0 EPR=$25 EPR=$0 EPR=$25 EPR=$0 EPR=$25
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the marginal benefits, the larger the impact.  Scenario CI2 is characterized by the largest 
impact on NEBi :   MNEBis= $1702 as a result of a $1 increase in CNEBs (Syria). Turkey’s 
impact on Iraq is much smaller (MNEBit=$8.92).  
 
Tables 8 and 9 present minima, maxima, and ranges of water allocations associated to 
the PFS under the 18 scenarios. Table 8 shows that the ranges for urban uses are relatively 
small as compared to those for agricultural uses, because of limited size and high economic 
return.  Increases  in  annual  flows  lead  to  increases  in  agricultural  consumptions.  Table  9 
presents similar data total water withdrawal by country. When energy generation is ignored 
(Pe=$0/MWh), increasing water availability decreases the ranges of water consumptions for 
both Turkey and Iraq. When energy generation is included (Pe=$25/MWh), increasing water 
supply does not lead to significant changes in the water consumption ranges of both Turkey 
and Syria. However, Iraq’s water consumption range is significantly reduced, implying that 
the amount of water withdrawn satisfies almost all feasible consumptive uses in Iraq. 
 
Table 8: Ranges of Water Withdrawals by Use (10
3 Mm
3) 
Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max
WTU 1.91    6.83      8.75      3.24    5.50      8.75      1.01    7.74      8.75      0.94     7.81      8.75      0.89    7.85      8.75      1.10     7.65      8.75     
WTA 2.71    56.74    59.45    2.97    55.44    58.41    4.62    84.90    89.51    13.51   71.65    85.16    4.61    96.83    101.45   14.07   80.67    94.73   
WTU 2.06    6.69      8.75      2.00    4.32      6.32      0.89    7.85      8.75      1.10     5.22      6.32      0.93    7.82      8.75      2.30     5.12      7.42     
WTA 2.81    56.74    59.56    1.89    56.82    58.72    4.63    84.88    89.51    13.20   74.54    87.75    4.63    96.88    101.51   15.82   81.04    96.86   
WTU 1.91    4.40      6.32      1.89    4.42      6.32      0.66    8.09      8.75      1.21     5.10      6.32      0.90    7.85      8.75      2.19     5.22      7.42     
WTA 2.41    57.40    59.80    1.99    57.00    59.00    3.79    84.89    88.68    13.53   73.78    87.30    3.56    96.75    100.31   15.08   81.04    96.12   









Table 9: Ranges of Water Withdrawals by Country (10
3 Mm
3) 
Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max
WTt 22.12     -       22.12    13.22     0.08      13.30    15.90     5.75      21.65    13.48     0.30      13.77    10.08     11.38    21.46    13.97     0.27      14.24   
WTs 8.10       0.14      8.24      8.73       0.01      8.74      5.44       2.80      8.23      8.56       0.61      9.17      1.00       7.39      8.39      8.52       0.86      9.38     
WTi 26.22     37.62    63.84    19.21     43.31    62.52    11.78     68.38    80.16    5.57       72.09    77.66    6.54       80.34    86.88    7.41       79.45    86.86   
WTt 22.69     -       22.69    11.21     0.04      11.24    14.66     5.83      20.48    11.12     0.25      11.37    10.09     11.35    21.44    11.84     0.30      12.14   
WTs 8.24       -       8.24      8.72       0.02      8.74      3.09       5.19      8.28      8.50       0.67      9.17      1.24       7.39      8.63      8.70       0.68      9.38     
WTi 26.75     37.12    63.87    16.88     44.68    61.55    10.64     69.50    80.13    4.88       73.33    78.21    6.70       80.19    86.89    5.11       81.47    86.58   
WTt 16.08     -       16.08    9.60       0.03      9.63      11.66     6.02      17.68    9.77       0.27      10.03    6.82       10.91    17.73    9.38       0.24      9.62     
WTs 7.24       0.14      7.39      8.72       0.01      8.74      4.60       2.85      7.44      8.55       0.62      9.17      1.32       7.24      8.56      8.74       0.64      9.38     
WTi 19.04     43.03    62.07    15.10     46.52    61.63    7.78       72.30    80.09    4.01       74.20    78.20    4.11       82.77    86.89    4.56       82.07    86.63   
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5.  CONCLUSION 
The countries  of  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  basin  have  implicit and  explicit  powers 
derived  from  their  geographical  positions,  socio-economic  characteristics,  military  power, 
internal affairs, and international affiliations. These powers may be implicitly (or explicitly) 
considered in the process of negotiations for water resources allocation. In a multi-objective 
programming setting, these weights provide net economic benefit points on the associated 
Pareto Frontier Surface (PFS), where none of the countries can be made better-off without 
making the others worse-off. The PFS is generated with the constraint method, using the best 
available data.  
  Obtaining the PFS enables the negotiating parties to understand: 1) at the macro scale, 
how  much  tradeoff  takes  place  among  the  countries,  and  their  marginal  impacts  on  each 
others; 2) at the micro scale, the detailed solutions for all the optimization variables of the 
ETRBM (e.g., how much water needs to be withdrawn, how much water needs to be released 
etc.). Once a PFS is obtained, any allocation or reallocation decision or agreement can be 
easily located on the associated PFS and can be easily evaluated.  With regard to the scenarios 
analyzed  with  the  constraint  method,  it  has  been  observed  that:  (1)  including  energy 
production reduces the size of the PFS; (2) the more water in the basin, the smaller the trade-
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          APPENDIX    
 
Indices  
i:      demand nodes (1 to 63)   
j & l:      supply nodes (1 to 45) 
agr:  set of agricultural demand nodes 
urb:  set of urban demand nodes 
Variables 
NEB:        total benefit net of transportation costs    ($) 
NEBt:  net economic benefit of Turkey  ($) 
NEBs:  net economic benefit of Syria                     ($) 
NEBi:  net economic benefit of Iraq                      ($) 
Qjl:  inter-nodal flow  (node j to node l)                                             (Mm
3)   
Q21,12:  total water transfer from Turkey to Syria through link 21 to 12  (Mm
3) 
Q28,14:  total water transfer from Turkey to Iraq through link 28 to 14  (Mm
3) 
Q31,16:  total water transfer from Turkey to Iraq through link 31 to 16  (Mm
3) 
Wji:  water transferred from supply node j to demand node i  (Mm
3) 
Parameters 
Cag:     agricultural water transport unit cost             ($ per Mm
3-km) 
Cur:     urban water transport unit cost                 ($ per Mm
3-km) 
Vag:    agriculture water unit value                       ($ per Mm
3) 
Vur:    urban water unit value                        ($ per Mm
3) 
Css:       internodal water transport unit cost               ($ per Mm
3-km) 
Dii:  distance from supply node j to demand node i  (km) 
Djl:  distance from supply node j to supply node l  (km) 
Pe:         energy price for electricity                  ($  per MWh) 
Ej:  electric generation rate for node j dam  (MWh per Mm
3) 
Minag :   minimum agricultural consumption rate            (Mm
3 per ha) 
Maxag :   maximum agricultural consumption rate            (Mm
3 per ha) 
Minur :   minimum urban consumption rate                   (Mm
3 per inhabitant) 
Maxur :  maximum urban consumption rate                   (Mm
3 per inhabitant) 
ELj :  reservoir evaporation loss at supply node j       (Mm
3) 
RFij :  return flow rate from demand node i to supply node j   
Si :   size of demand node i (hectare for agricultural nodes, inhabitants for urban nodes) 
Tj :     tributary inflow at node j     (Mm
3) 
 
           